



uch, Stuart,
arrie, CPT, DoD
, Mr, DoD OGC;
D OGC

10/10/20

All:

Please read below.

[REDACTED] made some serious allegations against me as the Chief Prosecutor---charges that, if true, mandate that I be relieved of my duties.

Among other things, [REDACTED] insists that an "environment of dishonesty, secrecy, and deceit" exists within the entire office.

In an email preceding Capt [REDACTED] you will note that [REDACTED] voiced similar views: he states that he is "disgusted" with the "lack of vision" and "lack of integrity" in the office, and has "utter contempt" for many of the judge advocates serving with us.

Bottom line: [REDACTED] believe that what we are doing is so wrong that they cannot "morally, ethically, or professionally continue to be a part of this process."

I am convinced to the depth of my soul that all of us on the prosecution team are truly dedicated to the mission of the Office of Military Commissions---and that no one on the team has anything but the highest ethical principles. I am also convinced that what we are doing is critical to the Nation's on-going war on terrorism, that what we have done in the past---and will continue to do in the future---is truly the "right" thing, and that the allegations contained in these emails are monstrous lies.

It saddens me greatly that two judge advocates---whom I like very much and for whom I have only the greatest respect and admiration---think otherwise. In fairness to all of you, however, it is important that you read what has been written about me and you.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

OGC

myself, 4:00 p.m. today, Col Borch's office

Sir,

I appreciated the opportunity to meet last Thursday night, as well as the frankness of the discussion. The topics covered and the comments made have been replaying in my mind since we ended the meeting. I have also reviewed Maj Preston's comments in his e-mail below, and I agree with them in every respect.

I feel a responsibility to emphasize a few issues. I do not think that our current troubles in the office stem from a clash of personalities. It would be a simple, common, and easily remedied situation to correct if this were true. People could be reassigned or removed.

It is my opinion that our problems are much more fundamental. Our cases are not even close to being adequately investigated or prepared for trial. This has been openly admitted privately within the office. There are many reasons why we find ourselves in this unfortunate and uncomfortable position - the starkest being that we have had little to no leadership or direction for the last eight months. It appears that instead of pausing, conducting an honest appraisal of our current preparation, and formulating an adequate prosecution plan for the future, we have invested substantial time and effort to conceal our deficiencies and mislead not only each other, but also those outside our office either directly responsible for, or asked to endorse, our efforts. My fears are not insignificant that the inadequate preparation of the cases and misrepresentation related thereto may constitute dereliction of duty, false official statements, or other criminal conduct.

An environment of secrecy, deceit and dishonesty exists within our office. This environment appears to have been passively allowed to flourish, if it has not been actively encouraged. The examples are many, but a few include:

██████████ misrepresentations at the Mock Trial, to include stating that we had no reason to believe that al Bahlul had suffered any mistreatment or torture. When I confronted him immediately after the mock trial with his notes to the contrary, he admitted that he was aware of abuse allegations related specifically to al Bahlul. Interestingly, it was because of Prof. Wedgewood's comments at the mock trial that we even began to inquire into the conditions at the detention camps in AF, which prior to the mock trial had been consciously ignored. Other troubling aspects of the mock trial include, but are not limited to: statements that we would be ready for trial in 3 days, that al Bahlul has maintained from day one that he is a member of AQ, the deliberate and misleading presentation of select statements from al Bahlul, the careful coordination of the schedule to limit meaningful questions, the conscious inclusion of an overwhelming amount of paper in the notebooks, and the refusal to include a proof analysis.

2. Suppressing FBI Allegations of Abuse at Bagram - Over dinner and drinks, KK and Lt Trivett heard from FBI agents

that detainees were being abused at the Bagram detention facility. Lt Trivett told KK after dinner that they couldn't report the allegations because it was told to them "in confidence." [REDACTED] anyway, and all three stated that there was not credible evidence and concluded on their own volition that they should not report the allegation to you or other members of the office. Interestingly, [REDACTED] recently suggested the [REDACTED] despite his lack of experience and judgment, be sent to review the CID reports of abuse at Bagram.

3. Refusal to give Mr. Haynes the COLE video -

Mr. Haynes asked [REDACTED] twice for a copy of the COLE video. I heard [REDACTED] whether she should take a copy of the video over to Mr. Haynes. CDR Lang told her not to, and that maybe in a few days Mr. Haynes would forget that he asked for it.

4. The disappearance/destruction of evidence -

As I have detailed to you, my copy of CDR Lang's notes detailing the 302 in which al Bahlul claims torture and abuse is now missing from my notebook. The 302 can not be located. Additionally, Craig King of the FBI related last week that he called and spoke to CDR Lang about the systematic destruction of statements of the detainees, and CDR Lang said that this did not raise any issues.

5. "I've known about this for a year."

Hamden's name is on the UN 1267 list, and we only learned of it in Dec. When [REDACTED] was confronted with this information, he claimed that he had known about it for the last year. No attempt had been made prior to Dec to discover upon what evidence Hamdan was added to the list, and we still don't know. If he was aware of this fact, one is left to wonder why no inquiry was made with the State Department. He made the same "I've known about this for a year" claim about the Tiger Team AQ 101 brief, although he has had many of us searching for the information contained within it for months.

[REDACTED] misrepresentations at the office [REDACTED] overview of his case. As detailed in a previous e-mail to you [REDACTED] made numerous misrepresentations concerning his case at the office meeting to discuss his case, indicating that he either consciously lied to the office, or does not know the facts of his case after 18 months of working on it.

I have discussed each of these specific examples with you, and you told me that you had taken corrective action to some. For example, in reference to paragraph 2, I asked how I was suppose to trust these attorneys to review documents and highlight exculpatory evidence and you responded that "when the time comes" you would put out very direct guidance. I do not believe that ethical behavior is something that can be directed during selective time periods.

These examples are well known to the members of this office, yet there has been no public rebuke of the behaviors. Hence, the environment and behaviors continue to flourish. I am left to wonder why at an office meeting we were not told:

"I understand that misrepresentations are being

made concerning the facts of our cases. If I find out this happens again, the responsible party is going to be fired."

"I understand that evidence is being withheld from our civilian leadership.. If I find out this happens again, someone is going to be fired."

"I understand that allegations of abuse are not being brought to my attention or reported to the appropriate authorities. If I find out this happens again, someone is going to be fired."

"I understand that evidence is being hidden or destroyed. If I find out this happens again, someone is going to be fired."

Even in regard to [REDACTED] recent behavior towards Maj Preston and myself, the office was not told the real reason for why he has been removed as the deputy, only further feeding the underlying animosity and indicating that the action was forced upon you and not really justified - if not, surely you would have taken a less conciliatory stance.

You stated in our meeting last week that what else can you do but lead by example.

In regard to this environment of secrecy, deceit and dishonesty, the attorneys in this office appear to merely be following the example that you have set.

A few examples include:

You continue to make statements to the office that you admit in private are not true. With many of the issues listed here, the modus operandi appears to be for you to make a statement at a meeting, pause, and when no one states a disagreement, assume that everyone is in agreement. To the listener, it is clear that the statements are not true, but we are not to correct, disagree, or question you in front of the office. (For example, when I asked you basic questions concerning conspiracy law at an office briefing, [REDACTED] led me into his office and told me that my conduct was borderline disrespectful because it put you in an uncomfortable position.)

You have stated for months that we are ready to go immediately with the first four cases. At the same time, e-mails are being sent out admitting that we don't have the evidence to prove the general conspiracy, let alone the specific accused's culpability. In fact, it may be questioned how we are in a better position to prove the general conspiracy today than we were last November at the mock trial. Of course, it should also be noted that we have substantially changed course even since November and now acknowledge that the plan to prove

principal liability for [REDACTED] guided
to say the least.

We are rushing to put 9 more RTBs together for cases that you admit are not even close to being ready to go trial. We are also being pressed to prepare charge sheets, and you have asked that discovery letter go out on these cases. We are led to believe that representations are being made are that these cases can be prosecuted in short order, when this simply is not true.

You told the AF generals that we had no indication that al Bahlul had been tortured. It was after this statement, which [REDACTED] quietly allowed to go uncorrected, that I brought up [REDACTED] missing notes to the contrary. You admitted to me that you were aware that al Bahlul had made allegations of abuse.

In our meeting with OGA, they told us that the exculpatory information, if it existed, would be in the 10% that we will not get with our agreed upon searches. I again brought up the problem that this presents to us in the car on the way back from the meeting, and you told me that the rules were written in such a way as to not require that we conduct such thorough searches, and that we weren't going to worry about it.

You state in a morning meeting that al Bahlul has claimed "in every statement" that he was an AQ member. When I told you after the meeting that this was not true, you simply admitted that you hadn't read the statements but were relying on what [REDACTED] had told you. As I have detailed in another e-mail, it does not appear that [REDACTED] is even aware of how many statements al Bahlul has made, let alone conducted a thorough analysis.

When [REDACTED] raises concerns about him advising the AA given the potential appearance of partiality, you advised him not to stop giving advice, but to only give advice orally.

[REDACTED] is emphasized at morning meetings, with you in the office, that we do not need to be putting so many of our concerns in e-mails and that we can just come down and talk. Given the disparity between what is said in causal conversation and the statements made by our leadership in e-mails, it is understandable that we have relied more and more on written communications.

You have repeatedly said to the office that the military panel will be handpicked and will not acquit these detainees, and we only needed to worry about building a record for the review panel. In private you have went further and stated that we are really concerned with review by academicians 10 years from now, who will go back and pick the cases apart.

We continue to foster the impression that CITF is responsible for our troubles and lack of evidence, although we have learned in the last few weeks that we haven't even sat down with the case agents to figure out what evidence they have and how they have

gathered it. You acknowledged last week that we will not even try to fix the problems with CITF. What is perhaps most disturbing about the lack of progress by our investigative agents is that it does not appear we have ever adequately explained the deficiencies to the CITF leadership.

Our morning meetings, briefings, and group discussions are short and superficial - it could be argued designed to permit a claim that the office has discussed or debated a certain topic without permitting such meaningful discussions to actually take place. Two prosecutors were scheduled 15 minutes each to go over the facts of their case. Charge sheets are reviewed by the office the afternoon that they are to be taken over to the Deputy AA. The lay down on the general conspiracy is cursory and devoid of meaningful comments or suggestions. The fact that we did not approach the FBI for assistance prior to 17 Dec - a month after the mock trial - is not only indefensible, but an example of how this office and others have misled outsiders by pretending that interagency cooperation has been alive and well for some time, when in fact the opposite is true.

It is claimed that the Tiger Team didn't do "shit" when in fact many of the products (i.e., AQ 101 and the statement of predicate facts) that they put together almost two years ago closely mirror products that have taken us months to put together. In fact, even a cursory review of the Tiger Team materials we now have (after several efforts to get them were sharply rebuffed by our own staff) shows that the Tiger Team had articulated many of the obstacles we now face and had warned that if these obstacles were not removed that prosecutions could not succeed.

As part of this atmosphere that you fostered, Maj Preston was publicly rebuked for bringing this issue to the group's attention and you specifically stated that you had reviewed the tiger team materials, there was little if any usable material in them, and that the demise of the tiger team had been the result of an unfortunate personality clash and nothing else. A review of the files shows otherwise.

From June to December, you were only present in the office for brief periods, often less than 4 hours every two weeks. However, you continued to insist that [REDACTED] spoke for you and directed those who e-mailed you with [REDACTED] address them with CDR Lang. It is difficult to believe that his deficiencies were unknown at that time, and consequently it is difficult to believe that you were unaware of the fact that we had little to no direction during that time frame. The fact that he directed each of us in the office not to speak to you directly was, and remains to me, astonishing - but does permit one to argue that they were unaware of any difficulties during a critical period of this endeavor.

One justification for the concealment and minimization of the problems has been the often stated proposition that MG Altenburg will be able to remedy many of these problems when he becomes the Appointing Authority. However, you have recently stated that MG Altenburg is a good friend of yours, that you hope he will be heavily reliant on [REDACTED] for a period of time, and that we will not be forwarding any documentation of cases (e.g. proof analysis) to MG Altenburg which suggests that he will not be in a position to exercise independent judgment or oversight.

It is my opinion that the primary objective of the office has been the advancement of the process for personal motivations -- not the proper preparation of our cases or the interests of the American people.

The posturing of our prosecution team chiefs to maneuver onto the first case is overshadowed only by the zeal at which they hide from scrutiny or review the specific facts of their case - thereby assuring their participation.

The evidence does not indicate that our military and civilian leaders have been accurately informed of the state of our preparation, the true culpability of our accuseds, or the sustainability of our efforts.

I understand that part of the frustration with Maj Preston's discussions with BG Hemingway was that you did not have the opportunity to discuss the matters with him in the first instance. It was clear from the discussions with BG Hemingway that he was unaware of the lack of preparation with our cases prior to signing the charges, or many of the other problems that we have discussed.

You have stated that you are confident that if you told MG Altenburg that we needed more time that he would give it to you. Underlying this comment is the fact that MG Altenburg has not been made aware of the significant shortcomings of our cases and our lack of preparation and cooperation with outside agencies.

I also have significant reason to believe that Mr. Haynes has not been advised in the most accurate and precise way. It appears that even the results and critiques of the mock trial, described like so many other efforts in this office as a "home run," were manipulated to present the maximum appearance of endorsement (for example, the reorganization and bold-face in the critique that was openly discussed in the office) 

We originally alleged that the accuseds were responsible as principles for 9/11, the COLE and the embassy bombings. Additionally, we alleged that al Qosi was involved with Mubarak and that al Bahlul was aware of Atta and Jarrah, and was somehow linked to a 9/11 meeting in Malaysia. I understand that significant policy decisions have yet to be vetted with DOJ OLC, and that they appeared less than totally comfortable with our theory of liability and culpability of the accuseds.

The comments we have heard in the office appear to revolve around one goal - to get the process advanced to the point that it can not be turned off. We are told that we just need to get defense counsel assigned, because then they can't stop the process and we can fix the problems. We just need to get charges approved because then they can't stop the process and then maybe we can fix the problems.

If the appropriate decisionmakers are provided accurate information and determine that we must go forward on the path we are currently on, then all would be very committed to accomplishing this task. However, it instead appears that the decisionmakers are being provided false information to get them to make the key decisions, to only learn the truth after a point of no return.

It is at least possible that the appropriate officials would be more concerned about approving charges, arraigning accuseds, and signing more RTBs prior to the arguments in front of the Supreme Court if they knew the true state of the cases and the position they will be left in this fall.

[It is also unclear how the steadfast refusal to have the prosecutors co-located with the CITF agents is in the interests of the American people or the preparation of the cases, and could be motivated by anything but a purely personal issue with someone involved in the process. You have admitted that both organizations productivity would be greatly increased.]

To address at least some of the underlying issues, the following may be proposed:

1. After fully informing the sages or invitees to the Mock Trial of the deficiencies we now acknowledge, solicit their recommendations and suggested courses of action.
2. Before MG Altenburg signs in -- taking on the AA responsibility and further damaging his lucrative private practice -- fully and accurately brief him on the status of our cases, our theories of liability, and the likely timetable in which we would be able to prepare cases after al Bahlul and al Qosi.
3. Fully and accurately brief Mr. Haynes and DOJ on the status of our cases, our theories of liability, and the likely timetable in which we would be able to prepare cases after al Bahlul and al Qosi.
4. Take immediate action within the office to develop a comprehensive prosecution strategy.
5. Take immediate action within the office to establish an environment that fosters openness, honesty, and ethical behavior.
6. Replace current prosecutors with senior experienced trial litigators capable of maintaining objectivity while zealously preparing for trial.

Instead, what I fear the reaction to Maj [REDACTED] and my concerns will simply be a greater effort to make sure that we are walled off from the damaging information - as we are aware has been attempted in the past.

I would like to conclude with the following -- when I volunteered to assist with this process and was assigned to this office, I expected there would at least be a minimal effort to establish a fair process and diligently prepare cases against significant accused. Instead, I find a half-hearted and disorganized effort by a skeleton group of relatively inexperienced attorneys to prosecute fairly low-level accused in a process that appears to be rigged. It is difficult to believe that the White House has approved this situation, and I fully expect that one day, soon, someone will be called to answer for what our office has been doing for the last 14 months.

I echo [REDACTED] belief that I can not morally, ethically, or professionally continue to be a part of this process. While many may simply be concerned with a moment of fame and the ability in the future to engage in a small-time practice, that is neither what I aspire to do, nor what I have been trained to do. It will be expected that I should have been aware of the shortcomings with this endeavor, and that I reacted accordingly.

v/r,

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Ma'am

While I appreciate the sentiment, I have to tell you that I don't see a lot of use continuing to talk about this stuff, unless your looking at reassigning us out of this office. I don't intend to speak for John although I know he feels the same way, but for me I sincerely believe that this process is wrongly managed, wrongly focused and a blight on the reputation of the armed forces. I don't have anything knew to say. I am pretty sure that everyone in the world knows my sentiments about this office and this process.

Certainly there have been some unfortunate symptomatic issues like [REDACTED] heightened animosity towards John (and I'm not going to let that one go either), but my fundamental

concerns here have nothing to do with personality conflicts or intellectual disagreements.

I don't think that anyone really understands what our mission is, but whatever we are doing here is not an appropriate mission. I consider the insistence on pressing ahead with cases that would be marginal even if properly prepared to be a severe threat to the reputation of the Military Justice System and even a fraud on the American people - surely they don't expect that this fairly half-assed effort is all that we have been able to put together after all this time.

At the same time, my frank impression of my colleagues is that they are minimizing and/or concealing the problems we are facing and the potential embarrassment of the Armed Forces (and the people of the United States) either because they are afraid to admit mistakes, feel powerless to fix things, or because they are more concerned with their own reputations than they are with doing the right thing. Whether I am right or wrong about that, my utter contempt for most of them makes it impossible for me to work effectively.

Frankly, I became disgusted with the lack of vision and in my view the lack of integrity long ago and I no longer want to be part of the process - my mindset is such that I don't believe that I can effectively participate - professionally, ethically, or morally.

I lie awake worrying about this every night. I find it almost impossible to focus on my part of the mission - after all, writing a motion saying that the process will be full and fair when you don't really believe it will be is kind of hard - particularly when you want to call yourself an officer and a lawyer. This assignment is quite literally ruining my life.

I really see no way to fix this situation other than reassignment. I don't want to be an obstacle to anyone, but I'm not going to go along with things that I think are wrong - and I think this is wrong. It's not like I'm going to change my opinion in order to "go along with the program." I'm only going to persist in doing what I think is right and at some point that is going to lead to even harder feelings. Half the office thinks we are traitors anyway and frankly I think they are gutless, simple-minded, self-serving, some, or all of the above so you can see how that's going to go...

I know even well-meaning people get tired of hearing this, but the fact is that I really can't stomach doing this and I really don't want to waste time talking about it.



To [REDACTED], John,
CF [REDACTED]
Cc [REDACTED]
Su [REDACTED] myself,
4:
M

[REDACTED] and I had a long talk this morning.
Based on his expressions of concern for some unresolved issues,
including both ethical matters and person