9/11 Commission, Memorandum for the Record, 11/20/2003, State Department Interviews
9/11 Commission, Memorandum for the Record, 11/20/2003, State Department Interviews9/11 Commission interview with Maura Harty, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Consular Affairs, Department of State, and Jamie Borek, Assistant Legal Counsel, Department of State. Discussion of improvements, and areas in need of improvement, related to the State Department's handling of intelligence in the wake of September 11.
Labels: 9-11, 9-11-Commission, INTELFILES, State-Department
9/11 Commission Memoranda on Extremism in Pakistan
In light of recent developments in Pakistan, it's useful and interesting to take a look at some of the interviews conducted in Pakistan by the 9/11 Commission, which spoke with State Department hands, Pakistani officials at various levels and local journalists.
What immediately grabs you about these accounts is the breathtaking state of denial among Pakistani officials. One wonders what they think now.
10/25/2003: 9/11 Commission Memorandum For The Record, interview with Retired Lt. Gen. Syed Iftikhar Hussain Shah, Governor of the Northwest Frontier Province"[T]he Governor strongly disputed the coalition perception of the situation. He flatly stated that terrorist groups could not have a base in the NWFP; it was 'impossible.' Madrassas were in cities, not the countryside. Weapons would have to be used for training, making noise that would give them away. That would be reported. Most of the population was not with the jihadis. These people were probably being harbored in Afghanistan."
10/26/2003: 9/11 Commission Memorandum For The Record, interview with U.S. State Department Country Team, Islamabad"Asked what the current government wants to accomplish, beyond the defense and foreign policy sphere, emphasis was placed on economic stability, controlling corruption, sustaining some kind of democratic transition, and developing moderate Islam."
10/27/2003: 9/11 Commission Memorandum For The Record, interview with Ashraf Naser, Chief Secretary of Balochistan"We told him that we had concerns about Balochistan, that many informed officials in both Afghanistan and Pakistan had told us that it is unsafe, insecure and that extremists are gaining the upper hand there. Naser disagreed vehemently with this characterization. 'Why don't you come to Quetta with me? He invited. Foreign journalists roam freely
there. I don't see a problem.' [...]
"Naser said that the U.S. had more or less brought the 9/11 attacks on itself. You left Afghanistan unattended, we told you that was a mistake. We knew what was happening
there. But the Pakistanis could not control the Taliban in Afghanistan.
"He asserted that the recent sectarian killings in Balochistan were part of an Afghan plot to destabilize the region. The suicide bombers were part of Taliban groups trained in Afghanistan, he said. These suicide bombers were Baloch from south of Quetta, they were trained by Indians in Afghanistan. 'The Northern Alliance is openly contemptuous of us.'"
10/27/2003: 9/11 Commission Memorandum For The Record, interview with Secretary Tasneem Noorani, Pakistani Ministry of Interior"He indicated that he and the entire Ministry were in shock by the 9-11 attacks and were struck by the scale and scope of the attacks. They couldn't image that the attacks could be connected with Pakistan. The initial reaction was a total blank. They didn't know how to react.
"Only after the US began discussing Usama bin Laden did the Ministry become aware of UBL and that the region, Pakistan and Afghanistan, was somehow involved. UBL was not known in Pakistan. He is an eccentric Saudi and was not understood by most people. [...]
"The Secretary seemed completely surprised by evidence that KSM had been active in Karachi and that he celebrated the 9-11 attacks in there and was actually interviewed by a journalist in Karachi about the attack. This information was a surprise to the Secretary. He asked for proof. He didn't believe any accounts of journalists in this regard."
The U.S. consul in Karachi didn't fare much better before the Commission's questioning.
10/20/2003: 9/11 Commission Memorandum For The Record, interview with Douglas C. Rohn, Consul General, U.S. Consulate, Karachi"The Consul did not have a very informed understanding of the type and sophistication of the threat in Karachi or the region. He had no estimate of the al Qai' da presence, though he recognized that they have long operated in the region. His insights into the terrorist threat, from his few months on the job, were very basic and didn't provide any new information ... 'we've been attacked here in Karachi, the bad guys are out there, I'm trying to keep American safe.'"
It wasn't all bad, however. There were a few people who seemed to know what they were talking about.
10/25/2003: 9/11 Commission Memorandum For The Record, interview with Arlene Ferrill, Consul General, U.S. Consulate, Peshawar"CG Ferrill commented on the NWFP government that arose out of the parliamentary elections in the fall of 2002. Eveyone had been surprised, including the victors, by the success of the six-party Islamic coalition, led by the JI (Qazi Hussain Ahmed) and JUI(Fezlur Rahman), Their rhetorical agenda calls for restoration of Sharia law and stresses anti-American themes. [Comment: An Islamic coalition also won power at the same time in Balochistan.] The popular climate in the NWFP is anti-American. In that sense, not much has changed in Peshawar since 9111. Though openly wearing guns has stopped in Peshawar, it continues in the tribal areas - as does the availability of a wide variety of arms in nearby bazaars."
10/27/2003: 9/11 Commission Memorandum For The Record, interview with journalist Ahmed Rashid"[Prior to 9/11], the US had a policy on terrorism, focused only on what they wanted with Bin Laden. But the Americans did not present Pakistan, then under sanctions, either with carrots or with sticks. Clinton had snubbed Pakistan with the way he had handled his visit, favoring India, in March 2000. To present carrots and/or sticks would have required a real geopolitical strategy toward Pakistan, not just toward terrorism."
Labels: 9-11, 9-11-Commission, INTELFILES, MFR, Pakistan, State-Department
10/2/2001: Secret Post-9/11 Briefing To World Leaders
Shortly after 9/11, U.S. embassies around the world were instructed to deliver a top-secret briefing to world leaders on the attacks of September 11. The report was a snapshot of everything the U.S. knew about al Qaeda at the time, including highly sensitive and classified intelligence helping prove the case that Al Qaeda had carried out the attack. The briefing also implicated Al Qaeda for the 1993 World Trade Center bombing and the 1995 thwarted Bojinka plot. Embassies were instructed on Oct. 2, 2001, to deliver "oral briefings only and not [repeat] not leave the document" in hard copy form.
According to the briefing:
"In the run-up to September 11, Bin Ladin and his associates seemed to be anticipating what we could only identify as an important event or activity, possibly an attack, although location and target were not clear."
An Al Qaeda informant "positively identified several of the September 11 hijackers as known Bin Ladin associates from photo spreads and possibly recognized other additional hijackers as well."
"All source intelligence reporting indicates that Bin Ladin and senior lieutenants had advance knowledge of the operational planning and timing for the attacks. Specific warnings went out to selected Bin Ladin confidents in Afghanistan and elsewhere to move to safe havens in anticipation of an immediate U.S. response following the attacks."
The document lists several key figures involved in the 9/11 attack, but notably fails to identify the plot's mastermind and operational commander, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed -- despite several references to the 1995 Bojinka plot, in which Mohammed conspired with his nephew Ramzi Yousef to execute a massive attack using civilian airliners.
Click here to read the briefing documentLabels: 9-11, INTELFILES, State-Department
State Department Documents Cited in 9/11 Commission Report, Part 1 of 2
The following documents are State Department cables which were referenced in the footnotes of the 9/11 Commission Report. A second batch will be posted within the next few weeks.
5/21/1996: Communique from Sudan re: Osama bin LadenNotification to U.S. government that Bin Laden and "Egyptian terrorist elements" have left the Sudan.
8/6/1996: Major Usama Bin Laden Asset DeregisteredBin Laden's Taba Investments (Tabba For Investment) deregistered by Sudanese government. Four Bin Laden firms are also discussed -- Wadi-Alageeg Construction Company, Tabba For Investment, El-Thimar Al-Mobark Agricultural Company, and the Khartoum Tannery.
9/14/1998: Secret meeting with Taliban Official Abdul Hakim MujahidTaliban warned that harboring Osama bin Laden has put "the Taliban and the U.S. on a collision course." Taliban reported that they had "warned
him once again not to engage in political or press activities."
10/12/1998: Secret meeting with Taliban official Maulawi Wakil AhmedSuggests "the Taliban are wrestling with the Bin Ladin issue and that their heretofore hard-line stance on this issue may be in some, sort of flux."
2/16/1999: Secret Memo, The Saudi Binladin Group, Builders to the KingClaims company "has sought to make clear that it has no links with the Islamist fanatic (and half brother) Usama by publicly and unequivocally condemning his actions and taking the necessary legal steps to ensure that all connections have been severed."
10/8/1998: Designation of Al Qaeda as a terrorist organization12/14/1999: Secret Memo, Saudis on US Warning to Taliban re: UBLThe Saudis agree that Bin Laden is a threat to the Kingdom.
Labels: INTELFILES, Osama-Bin-Laden, State-Department, Taliban
